Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2020

Deals
Victor P. Goldberg
Columbia Law School, vpg@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Victor P. Goldberg, Deals, 56 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 345 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3321

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

DEALS
VICTOR GOLDBERG

I. Risk........................................................................................346
II. Information...........................................................................349
A. Adverse selection.....................................................350

B.

Adaptation ............................................................... 353

III. Quantity and Price...............................................................356
IV. Concluding Remarks .......................................................... 361

Over a quarter of a century ago, Ron Gilson, Dan Raff, and I developed a new course, The Economics of Complex Transactions, which
came to be known as Deals. The motivation for the course was our perception of a great imbalance in the law school curriculum, which was
weighted heavily toward litigation, particularly appellate litigation.
While a substantial number of our graduates were becoming transactional lawyers, there was hardly anything available to prepare them for
that practice. Our concept was that lawyers were transaction engineers
and, when designing contracts, they faced a generic set of problems.
Furthermore, there were techniques for coping with these problems that
transcended particular transaction types.
The first two-thirds of our course focused on the problems and
provided techniques to cope with them. In the remaining third, the students were given the papers from a particular transaction and were
asked to explain how the parties dealt with the problems, and if they
could have done better. The types of transactions ranged from corporate acquisitions, long-term contracts, movie deals, construction projects (including a multi-billion-dollar expansion of the Panama Canal),
venture capital and private equity deals, and pharma-biotech projects.
We built the course around several concepts: risk; information (adverse
selection in particular); moral hazard; and adaptation to change (the reliance-flexibility tradeoff). We emphasized reverse engineering-if we
observe that parties do "X," then we try to find an explanation for it.
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I. RISK
Deals concern an uncertain future and structuring the transaction
requires a focus on future risks. Our students, like most of our colleagues, typically begin by invoking risk aversion to explain why a contract takes the shape that it does. We try to beat that out of them. We
begin by observing that risk aversion has a specific meaning: given the
choice between two packages with the same expected value, but a different variance, a risk averse party would choose the one with the
smaller variance. It does not mean that people are averse to bad outcomes. Risk aversion, we claim, rarely explains why parties structure a
deal in a particular way, and worse, it short-circuits inquiry. I will consider two examples-the purchase of insurance by public corporations
and sharing contracts.
Insurance seems like a natural area in which to invoke risk aversion. One party is concerned about some future bad outcomes, and for
a price, it lays off some of that risk on an insurance company that pools
risks. A risk averse party would be willing to pay for that service. That
seems plausible enough. But we then ask: why do publicly traded corporations buy liability insurance? Those corporations are owned by private parties who can deal with the risk by diversifying their portfolios.
Paying an insurance company for its risk-pooling service would be a
negative value proposition for the owners, reducing shareholder
wealth. To make matters even worse, the insurance gives the firm less
of an incentive to take care (moral hazard), causing even more economic harm to the shareholders (owners). So, if insurance is value reducing, why do the owners pay for it?
The answer is that insurance companies provide a number of services that can add value, and this has nothing to do with the risk preferences of the firms, the shareholders, the management, or the employees. The most obvious example is inspection services. In some lines of
insurance (steam boilers, elevators) over 20 percent of the premium
dollar goes toward inspection.' Corporations are willing to pay for services that decrease the likelihood of accidents. Whether they provide
the services themselves, rather than going to an outside supplier, is a
1. Indeed, the Hartford Steam Boiler Insurance and Inspection Company began as an inspection company. If an accident were to occur after an inspection, there would be a causation
question: did the accident occur despite the fact that the inspector did a workmanlike job? One
way of avoiding that question is to share responsibility for the damages by using the same tools
insurers do-deductibles, co-payments, and liability limitations. See victor P. Goldberg, The
Devil Made Me Do It: The CorporatePurchase of Insurance, 5 REv. L. & EcoN. 541, 543
(2009).
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standard make-versus-buy decision. The insurance company need not
supply all the services by itself; it could play the role of a general contractor, putting together a package of risk management services more
effectively than the corporation could do on its own. Notice that by
disregarding attitudes toward risk, we have an explanation of why a
corporation would buy insurance, and why, despite the potential moral
hazard, the purchase of insurance could reduce the costs of accidents.
Inspection is not the only service provided by insurance companies. The insurer's risk management is not confined to the pre-accident
period. If an accident were to occur, the insurer's incentive would be
to contain the post-accident losses (for example, legal services, claims
processing, and rehabilitation). Again, if an insurer could do this more
effectively than the corporation or other third-party .providers, the rational firm would purchase the service from the insurer. The insurance
package could be unbundled so that the clients might, for example, provide their own inspection services and legal defense, but purchase
claims management and rehabilitation services from insurers.
Even if the insurer provided none of the services alluded to above,
it could still add value in other ways. Incentivizing managers and evaluating their performance is hampered in a noisy environment. Distinguishing bad performance from bad luck can be difficult. If the insurance were to make management's performance more transparent by
isolating matters beyond the manager's control, a more effective incentive structure could enhance value. Insurance can also be a part of the
firm's capital structure, enabling the firm to carry a smaller inventory
of cash or other relatively liquid assets. In part, insurance is a substitute
for a line of credit. In fact, it is also a complement, since line of credit
agreements routinely require that the borrower carry insurance.
In many instances firms carry insurance not only because they
want to, but also because their counterparty insists upon it.2 Supply
contracts, commercial leases, and lending agreements commonly require that the supplier, lessee, or borrower maintain insurance coverage. It is reasonable to presume that the counterparties are not just busybodies, gratuitously meddling in the affairs of others. That raises the
question: Why might a buyer insist upon its supplier maintaining insurance coverage and how might such a requirement increase value? I can
suggest two plausible answers.

2.

Id.
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First, suppose that a supplier originally carried insurance, but that
it subsequently let the insurance lapse. What could a buyer infer from
the lapse? If the insurance company canceled the policy because the
supplier had failed to adopt loss-control mechanisms that the insurer
believed would adequately contain accident costs, and if such a failure
puts the supplier's future ability to perform in doubt, the buyer could
find the cancellation a valuable early warning. Moreover, if the supplier's position became more precarious, it might decide that protection
from the risks covered by insurance would have little value if the firm
failed to survive; it might choose instead to use the funds that would
otherwise be for insurance premiums to pursue high risk, negative expected value projects. The value of the limited guarantee provided by
the insurer to the supplier decreases the greater the risk of failure from
other causes. And conversely, that is when that guarantee would be
more valuable to the buyer. 3 Second, the buyer might be concerned that
it would be difficult to prove in court that a supplier had failed to perform; it might want to include in the contract terms that would increase
the likelihood that it would prevail. Because the failure to maintain insurance is an easily verifiable fact, the insurance clause could perform
this function. One virtue of the insurance clause is that it is cheap. The
supplier would, in general, want to maintain insurance coverage. It only
gives up the flexibility to drop the insurance coverage when things are
going poorly. By binding its hands, the supplier provides assurance to
the buyer of its continued ability to perform.
Risk aversion is also commonly invoked to explain the existence
of sharing contracts. But if we again put risk aversion aside and ask
why the sharing might enhance value regardless of risk preferences, we
can find several explanations. Sharing contracts are widespread in the
movie business. Compensation for the talent often includes contingent
compensation in the form of net or gross profits. 4 Paying a share of
future revenues to the talent acts as a tax on the studio's efforts to exploit the film. Like insurance, it would seem at first blush to be value
reducing. Why then would it increase the expected value? There are a
number of plausible explanations.

3. If the supplier's solvency were not a serious concern, there would be less reason to rely
on a third-party insurer. For example, DuPont could substitute self-insurance for third-party insurance. "DuPont represents that it is sufficiently self-insured and will continue to remain selfinsured at or above for the following levels and types of risk throughout the term of this Agreement .... " Id. at 549.
4. See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
13-36 (2006).
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First, since the contract is entered into before the film is made, it
makes it easier for the parties to economize on information. Second, it
provides incentives to both the talent and the film distributor, since both
affect the profitability of the project. Contingent compensation shows
up in other aspects of the movie business as well. The distributor-exhibitor contract typically provides for sharing revenues after a minimum has been met; the distributor-foreign distributor contract has a
similar structure. A studio sometimes contracts for a package of films
not yet produced, and those contracts typically include contingent compensation as well. In all of these deals, there is typically a minimum
that has to be covered before the sharing begins.5
Significantly, those contracts will include a no-cross-collateralization clause. Each film will begin to share revenues only after a minimum is met. This rejection of risk pooling is inconsistent with a risk
aversion explanation. The plausible explanation is that a no-cross-collateralization clause induces the studio to promote all the films, rather
than just backing the one hit and ignoring the less successful. The contract is structured so that the sharing kicks in only after the studio covers its costs; up to that point the studio's incentive to promote the less
successful films is unaffected by the sharing formula. No cross-collateralization clauses are common in licensing agreements as well. A
manufacturer might agree to produce dozens of different items for a
licensor; the contract typically provides for a fixed guarantee payment
by the manufacturer for each product and a royalty beyond that guarantee. In effect, the manufacturer receives 100% of the revenue up to
the guarantee for each product, so it has the incentive to provide effort
even for the products that are not so successful.
II. INFORMATION

Information is a central theme of the course. It shows up in two
contexts. First, since deals often concern the transfer of an asset of uncertain value, production of information about the asset can add value.
Second, since deals often take place over time, the parties will have to
adapt their behavior as new information appears. Since in asset sales
there can be a significant temporal gap between execution of the deal
and its closing, and during that period new information would become
available, the first category bleeds into the second.

5. The minimum need not be fixed. A net profits contract, for example, has a rolling breakeven point. See id

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

350

A.

[56:345

Adverse selection

For more than a generation, the "lemons problem" has been a staple of economic analysis. If sellers know the quality of what they are
selling and do not credibly reveal that quality, rational buyers reasonably infer that the quality is low and either refuse to buy or only offer to
buy at a price reflecting the presumed low quality. The seller needs to
convince the potential buyer of the high quality of whatever it is selling,
and there are lots of ways it could do so. For a repeat-player seller, the
need to protect its reputation provides some assurance to buyers. Building and maintaining a reputation is costly, so the seller might choose
instead to rent reputation from a third party. For example, the banks are
reputational intermediaries in international letter of credit sales; investment banks, accountants, and lawyers all can use their reputation to
provide some assurance to the parties in a corporate acquisition.
The seller has a number of options. It could post a bond, promising
pay
if the quality fails to meet the promised standard. It could include
to
representations and warranties in the agreement, providing the buyer
with some assurance that it will perform as promised. The seller could
make some of its compensation contingent upon quality. If the transaction had a substantial temporal component (a long-term supply contract
or a corporate acquisition with a significant gap between execution and
closing), the right to renegotiate or terminate could provide some assurance to the buyer. Suppose that a firm using a complex piece of machinery sells it to another for delivery three months hence. Its incentive
to maintain the machine properly in the interim is reduced. Conversely,
if it sells the machine with a warranty, the purchaser's incentive to take
care is compromised. In the latter case, the contract could offset the
buyer's weakened incentive by, among other things, including a consequential damages exclusion clause. If the machinery were to fail, the
buyer would bear the costs beyond the cost of repair or replacement.
A corporate acquisition illustrates a number of the devices available to the parties.6 In a typical corporate acquisition during the period
between the execution of the contract and the closing of the deal, information about the quality of the firm will be produced. The seller provides information in a data room and provides representations and warranties. What if a representation or warranty is wrong? The seller could
promise to indemnify the buyer or could make closing conditional on

6. In some instances, information about the buyer or the buyer's intentions can be important-cspecially if this were a stock transaction.
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the accuracy of the reps and warranties. The R&W's can be qualified
by materiality or knowledge (e.g., to the best of the seller's knowledge).
How much effort should go into producing knowledge? Producing the
information is costly, a cost ultimately borne by both parties.7 The
seller can further qualify the information it provides by specifying on
what the buyer can and cannot rely (reliance or "big boy" clauses). Or
the seller can isolate certain problematic areas; for example, if the firm
has some potential, but currently unknown product liability claims, an
insurer might, for a fee, accept the risk. Indeed, in recent years, some
insurers have begun to sell R&W insurance.
A corporate acquisition is a one-shot sale in which there typically
is a temporal gap between execution and closing. As in the machinery
sale alluded to above, much can happen in the intervening months.
Many of the possible changes are exogenous (e.g., a recession, changes
in the market for the target's product, and so forth). Some of the
changes, however, might be under the control of the target. It might
attempt to distribute profits, raise the pay of executives, or engage in
other activities that would adversely affect the value to the buyer. To
prevent this, the contract would include covenants and a material adverse change (MAC) clause, which would allow the seller to walk away
if the covenants were breached or a MAC occurred. If the value of the
target were to fall through no fault of the target, the buyer would have
an incentive to act opportunistically, invoking the MAC to either back
out of the deal or to force a renegotiation of the price.
Contracts anticipate this to some extent by including exceptions,
which hold that particular negative factors do not constitute a MAC.
The exceptions attempt to distinguish between effects that are under
the control of the target and those that are exogenous. The greater the
potential negative impact of a MAC's invocation on the value of the
target as a stand-alone, the more protection the target would insist upon.
In the interim between execution and closing, the target might, for example, have lost much of its management team; ties with customers,
bankers, and suppliers might have been severed; investments might
have been postponed; and the invocation of the MAC might convey to
the market that the target is "damaged goods." The greater the target's
reliance on consummation of the deal, the greater the protection it
would bargain for, either in the form of more stringent MAC exceptions, or a greater termination fee. Because courts have been reluctant
7. See Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239 (1984).
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to enforce MAC clauses, buyers often substitute breakup fees which
give the buyer the option to walk away from the deal.
The parties could choose to make part of the compensation contingent upon success. This could substitute for production of information, or more likely, complement it. A movie studio could, for example, pay a fee for the option to produce a particular project along
with the promise to pay a percentage of the net or gross profits if the
project is produced. An oil company likely has better information than
a landowner who might have some oil under its property. The oil company need not tell the landowner what it believes to be the quality of a
leased area. Contingent compensation in the form of a royalty would
reduce the landowner's need to obtain information.
Likewise, the seller of a business could include an earnout, making the price contingent upon some metric (sales, profits). Since the
firm would be under the control of the buyer, the earnout might have
to restrict the buyer's use of the firm. The earnout could distort incentives, and the design of the earnout would have to take that into account.
For example, if the compensation were a function of profits over the
next n years, the buyer has an incentive to make investments that will
pay off after n+1. The greater the rewards to time-shifting, the more the
seller would have to do to protect itself. The buyer's incentives to game
the earnout often result in the parties abandoning the earnout in their
negotiating the deal. However, even if the parties ultimately abandon
the earnout, negotiation of its terms, like negotiation of the reps and
warranties, can produce valuable information for the parties. Most corporate acquisitions do not use earnouts, suggesting that their value for
economizing on information might be restricted to certain contexts.
In many transactions, the value of the asset depends on the buyer's
expected future use of the asset. Consider, for example, a buyer who
believes a piece of property might be valuable for building a shopping
center. It could just buy the property and then try to line up tenants. If
it were to do so, the price it would pay would be discounted by the
likelihood that it would be unable to find enough tenants to make the
project viable. Alternately, it could get the information before buying
the land. However, if the buyer cannot keep the information secret, the
seller might use that information and deal directly with a second buyer.
The buyer would be reluctant to pursue information without some assurance that it would benefit if the information turned out to be positive.
One device for encouraging production of that information is for
the seller to give the buyer an option to buy the property at a price that
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reflected the value if the buyer were to succeed in lining up the tenants.8
That would provide the buyer with the time to produce the relevant
information and the security that if the information were positive, it
would be able to act on it. Of course, the buyer could behave strategically. It could attempt to take advantage of the information asymmetry,
(falsely) claim that the results were disappointing, and attempt to renegotiate the price down. It could also negotiate the initial strike price on
the basis of one expected use (say, the shopping center), when its real
concern was for a more valuable use. The seller can anticipate this latter
ploy by making the option contingent on satisfaction for a particular
use. Satisfaction clauses are a common device for conveying information on the buyer's intended use of the property.
B. Adaptation
The preceding discussion showed how the production of information between the time of a contract's execution and its closing could
increase value. I now turn to the problem of producing information
within the contractual relationship. Once the relationship has begun,
things change. The parties want the ability to adapt as new information
becomes available. That raises a number of questions. Should there be
a single decision maker making the decision to adapt? Who should
make that decision? How should the counterparty's interests be taken
into account? To what extent are the future facts endogenous? The
tradeoff between flexibility and reliance shows up in a number of contexts; the problem is exacerbated by the potential for opportunistic behavior by one party taking advantage of the other's past investments
made in reliance upon continuity.
The making of a movie, or the production of a television series,
provide good examples of the significance of adaptation as new information becomes available. As an extreme example, production of the
Lord of the Rings trilogy began three decades after acquisition of the
movie rights.9 Movie studios take options on the projects and, in effect,
take options on the talent in the form of "pay or play" clauses. With
8. The buyer might have a free look for 60 days. Some jurisdictions have held that if the
option price was too low (zero with a free look clause), there was no consideration; and therefore, the contract was unenforceable. The relevant cost to the potential buyer is not the option
price; rather, it is the expected cost of information acquisition. See GOLDBERG, supranote 4, at
91-100.
9. Wikipedia provides a summary of the development process. See The Lord of the Rings
(film series), wIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
TheLord of theRingsfilm trilogy (last updated July 8, 2020).
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these clauses, the talent promises to set aside a time period to make a
particular film; however, the studio maintains flexibility by reserving
the right not to make the film at all or to make the film without using
the talent. The studio would have a valuable option to abandon, but its
flexibility comes at a price. The price depends on the significance of
the talent and, implicitly, the talent's reliance (the opportunity cost of
the time set aside). For significant talent, this would typically take the
form of the fixed fee (which for major artists could be in the range of
$20 million). 10 The compensation of a star would typically include a
percentage of the gross receipts offset against a fixed fee (to be paid
even if the studio decides not to use the star).
The making of a television series adds two wrinkles. First, it involves a much longer chain of options-a pilot, initial production, and
renewals if the series is successful. As the series evolves, the importance of a character can change, and, in some instances, the character might simply be dropped. Second, if a show is successful, the talent
has an incentive to renegotiate the deal by threatening to walk away if
new, better terms are not agreed to." Studios are not defenceless in the
face of such threats. They can threaten to eliminate the actor from the
show, for example, by killing off the character.' 2
The option to abandon also plays a significant role in the contract
between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist. The entrepreneur's
project typically has a high likelihood of failure, and even if successful,
there would be a long period before the project would yield positive
returns. Rather than committing to fund the entire project, the venture
capitalist (VC) would phase the payments, retaining the right to terminate the funding if new information warranted it. Thus, after six
months, the VC could choose to continue funding the project or exercise its option to abandon. If it chose the latter, the entrepreneur could
attempt to raise funds from a new source. However, the contracts typically give the VC a first refusal right. So, if the entrepreneur were to
find an alternative source of funds, the VC could match. This creates a
problem for the entrepreneur since any potential funding source would
recognize that its offer would only be accepted if the VC (which almost
10. For more on pay or play clauses, see GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 279-309.
11. This can happen in movies as well; to avoid this risk, The Lord of the Rings trilogy
was all shot at the same time. By avoiding the renegotiation risk, the studio gave up the option
to abandon if the first film had been a failure.
12. See e.g., Jamie Weinman, The 20th Anniversary Of the Most Awesomest TV Contract
Dispute Ever, MACLEAN'S (Nov. 28, 2008), https://www.macleans.ca/uncategorized/the-20thanniversary-of-the-most-awesomest-tv-contract-dispute-ever/.
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certainly knows more than it does) thought the terms were unfavorable.
It is possible, therefore, that the VC would use the first refusal right
opportunistically to renegotiate down the price of the next round. What
protects the entrepreneur from this? Nothing in the contract. The entrepreneur's protection would come from the VC's role as a repeat player
because a reputation for chiseling in subsequent rounds of negotiation
would disadvantage the VC against its competition.
In both the movie and VC examples, the contract gave the decision
to adapt to change to one party. In the case of a pay-or-play contract,
the contract confronted that party with an option price that reflected the
talent's reliance. In the VC deal, the entrepreneur had no contractually
determined protection for its reliance.
In deals between Big Pharma (BP) firms and biotechs, the allocation of decision rights is more complicated, reflecting the timing of performance by the parties. In a typical deal, the biotech firm hopes to find
a viable product given its particular expertise. Its relationship with the
Big Pharma firm has three primary phases. To simplify, the biotech
provides the science, and BP provides the funding. If the biotech produces a potentially useful output, BP provides all the subsequent services (testing, getting approval, and marketing). In Phase 1, the BP behaves much like the VC. There will be a number of go/no go points.
BP will learn something about the quality of the biotech team and will
also learn whether the research appears promising. Like the VC, it will
have options to abandon at various times during the first phase.
In the second phase, the biotech will have produced a result that
appears to have commercial possibilities. In this phase, neither party
will have the exclusive right to decide on how to adapt to the new information. The solution is to set up a joint committee and to require
that decisions by the committee be unanimous. What if the committee
fails to produce a unanimous decision? In the event of a disagreement,
the dispute goes up the hierarchy, eventually to the CEOs of the two
firms. If they fail to resolve the dispute, then the parties are free to pursue legal remedies. The threat of having to kick a dispute up the hierarchy likely carries more weight than the threat of legal action.
As the project moves from research to the development stage, Big
Pharma's role becomes more important. The biotech has little more to
do at this point, and decision-making shifts to BP. The agreement
leaves the decision to BP's sole discretion; however, BP typically
promises to use diligent efforts to pursue the development and commercialization of each product at its own expense. It would have the
sole discretion to determine (a) which products to develop, market, or
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continue to develop or market; (b) which products to seek regulatory
approval for; and (c) when, where, how, and on what terms and conditions to market the products.
The BP might choose not to go forward with the project, perhaps
because it is pessimistic. The contract would deal with this possibility
by giving the biotech the right to commercialize the product itself. The
contract would likely require that if the biotech exercised that option it
would pay to BP some fraction of the development costs that the BP
had incurred. This is very similar to the notion of turnaround in the
movie business. If a studio were to decide not to go forward with a
project, another studio could take over the project if it paid the first
studio's costs thus far incurred.1 3 Of course, since the biotech would
not be able to pursue development on its own, it would have the right
to take the project to third parties.
The biotech's compensation would come in a number of pieces.
In the first two phases, it would have all (or most) of its variable costs
compensated. It would then be compensated as various milestones are
met. These milestones would include the initiation of human trials and
the approval of a new drug application. If the product were successfully
commercialized, the biotech would receive royalty payments.
III. QUANTITY AND PRICE

In a long-term contract, the parties could set both the quantity and
price for the entire length of the contract. However, conditions are
likely to change during the course of the contractual relationship, and
the parties might desire mechanisms that would adjust the quantity,
price, or both as the relationship unfolds. I want to focus first on quantity adjustment. The parties face two interrelated problems regarding
quantity determination. First, one or both parties might have to make
investments in reliance on continuation of the relationship. Second,
given the level of relation-specific investment that has been incurred,
how can they adapt the quantity decision to take into account new information?
First, consider an extreme case. A power plant is to be built adjacent to a fuel source yet to be developed. The only possible user of the
fuel would be the power plant. Assuming that the two parties cannot

13. The movie and pharma contracts only set a maximum price for the turnaround. The
BP or first studio might be willing to bargain and accept a lower price.
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combine into a single entity, how can they coordinate across organizational boundaries? Both parties could be subject to being held up. That
is, once the two projects are built, the other party could attempt to take
advantage of the other's vulnerability. The supplier could threaten to
slow down deliveries unless the buyer agreed to rework their contract,
increasing the price. Or the threat could go in the other direction. The
buyer could argue that the demand for power has fallen off and that it
would require a price reduction to continue operating at the same level.
If their contract were written to prevent any such efforts to revise
their agreement, they would be protected from such opportunistic behavior; but the cost of that protection would be to constrain their ability
to react as new information on costs and demand for electricity become
available.14 Of course, one solution is to combine the two into a single
entity-vertical integration. The integrated firm would be able to avoid
the threat of opportunism. Integration, however, is not a cure-all. Combining the two entities can result in other inefficiencies. Nonetheless,
where the threat of opportunistic behavior is high, common ownership
can be the cost-effective response.
One way of responding to the problem is to make the investments
on both sides less relation-specific. So, for example, the supplier could
sacrifice some of the locational advantages of being adjacent to the
power plant so that it might have alternative buyers for the fuel. And
the power plant might protect itself by having some excess capacity in
other plants it owns. Such strategies might result in higher costs than if
the supplier and buyer did not have to deal with the potential opportunism. Still, that might be the most cost-effective response.
Regardless of the precise level of relation-specific investment the
firm chooses, if the contract were to last for any length of time, the
parties would want the flexibility to adapt as production costs and market conditions change. The party that valued flexibility more would be
responsible for the quantity decision, and the counterparty would "sell"
flexibility, most likely indirectly. The "price" would settle somewhere
between the value to the former and the cost to the latter. I will consider
a number of examples.
Suppose that the product is merely a byproduct of the seller's primary output. For example, petroleum coke is a byproduct of the coking
process in an oil refinery and accounts for less than three percent of the
value. Suppose further that the buyer has either numerous alternative

14. 1 am ignoring the fact that enforcement of such a contract might be problematic.
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suppliers or the ability to store a substantial inventory. The seller would
not want its freedom to determine how much oil to refine to depend
upon its obligation to produce the byproduct. The contract would give
the discretion to the seller, typically in the form of an output contract,
and the "price" would be close to zero.' 5 At the other extreme, suppose
that the buyer would be selling the good (or a final product which incorporates the good) to a market with fluctuating demand. The contract
would give discretion to the buyer, in the form of a requirements contract.
Both the output and requirements contracts could include a minimum to confront the decision maker with a cost. There are a number of
ways of achieving this. The buyer could agree to take a minimum
amount in a specified time period. For example, in a take-or-pay contract, the buyer agrees to pay for a minimum quantity regardless of
whether it takes anything. In a multi-year contract, the buyer can get
increased flexibility by using a makeup clause to shift its obligation
between time periods. In a take-or-pay contract, the buyer pays a fixed
amount until the minimum is reached and then pays an additional price
per unit. A close relative of the take-or-pay is a stand-by agreement in
which the buyer pays a flat rate per period and pays the unit price immediately.1 6 The take-or-pay contract has a seller's analogue in the
form of a deliver-or-pay clause. The seller in a long-term contract
would have the option of delivering the goods in a time period or making a payment. That payment would be the difference between the contract price and the price the buyer had to pay to obtain the goods elsewhere.
If the parties enter a long-term contract, they could fix the price
initially for the length of the agreement, or they could use some mechanism for adapting the price to changed circumstances. For an extreme
example of the former, consider the Guinness 1759 lease on its Dublin
brewery.' 7 The lease was for a down payment of £100 plus a fixed
rental of £45 per year for 9,000 years. The landowner would have no
effect on the business, so all the decisions on operating the brewery

15. See GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 101-141.
16. Another device for pricing the buyer's flexibility is a revert-back clause. The buyer
gets a low unit price by agreeing to take a large quantity. If, however, it takes substantially less,
it would be back-charged a higher unit price.
17. Goran Blazeski, Arthur Guiness signed a 9000-year leasefor an abandonedbrewery
in Dublin: Guinness is still brewed at St. James Gate, THE VINTAGE NEWS (Jan. 7, 2017),
https://www.thevintagenews.com/2017/01 /07/arthur-guinness-signed-a-9000-year-lease-foran-abandoned-brewery-in-dublin-guinness-is-still-brewed-at-st-james-gate/.
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were in the hands of Guinness. In effect, this was a sale for a price of
£100 plus £45 divided by the discount rate,18 tied to a secured loan by
the landowner. If Guinness failed to pay, the property would revert to
the landowner.
There are lots of reasons for the parties to want to have the price
adapt to changing conditions during the life of the contract. If the contract were for a long period, there would be concerns about changes in
the price level (inflation). Even if the overall price level were not a
concern, there could be changes in relative prices-the prices of inputs
or competing products. If the contract price were to deviate too much
from the market price, one party could be disadvantaged and that could
put a strain on the relationship. The disadvantaged party could engage
in practices that would reduce the overall value of the relationshipfor example, working to the rules or flyspecking the contract. 19 A price
adjustment mechanism could add value by reducing the contract-market deviation and the incentives to engage in this value-reducing behavior.
There are a number of different devices for adjusting price. Indexing to an indicator of the overall price level (the Consumer Price Index,
the GNP deflators) can provide some protection from inflation. Indices
that are more closely related to the specific product are common. Oil
and gas prices, for example, were typically linked to prices reported in
Platt's Daily Oilgram. 20 Contracts can index various components of
costs, for example, labor costs or particular inputs. Under some circumstances, the price could be based on the supplier's costs. Cost-plus pricing, despite its perverse incentive effects, is common in contracts where
the parties cannot at the formation stage fully determine the nature of
the final product. It might, for example, be a component of a product
that has not yet been designed. Construction contracts typically include
room for change orders, and if the change were accepted, then the
builder's compensation would be cost-based.
In some circumstances, the contracts can track market conditions
by taking advantage of external offers. In a most favored nation clause,
18. If the discount rate were 5%, the sale price would have been £100 + £900 = £1,000.
19. For an example of a price adjustment mechanism gone awry, see NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). The contracts between
independent power producers and an electric utility set the price as a function of projected long
run avoidable costs; when those prices turned out to be well out of line, there ensued years of
renegotiation and litigation. See VICTOR GOLDBERG, RETH[NKING CONTRACT LAW AND

CONTRACT DESIGN 180-204 (2015).
20. See, e.g., E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
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the seller promises to treat this customer no worse than anyone else. In
a meeting completion clause, 2 1 the seller has the option of matching an
outside offer. Those mechanisms can only work if there is a realistic
possibility that a third party would be available.
The contract could allow for renegotiation, perhaps at specific intervals or if an indexed contract price was outside a contractually determined range. The contract would have to state what would happen
if the renegotiation were to fail. For example, the price would remain
unchanged for a specified time period, after which the contract would
be terminated. The parties could also rely on external parties (mediators, arbitrators, or the courts) to determine a new price. A "gross inequity" or "hardship" clause allows one party to assert that the contract
price is no longer out of line, and that the third party, if it agrees with
that assessment, should set a new price.
In Deals, we liked to use a familiar example of a price adjustment
mechanism that had gone awry. Many of our students had run into Alcoa v. Essex in their Contracts course. The dispute was over the failure of one component of the price adjustment mechanism to work
properly. However, we show that the parties and the court failed to understand the problem. Even if that component had worked perfectly,
the mechanism would have failed. The parties entered into the contract
in late 1968; Essex agreed to take a fixed amount of aluminum per year
from Alcoa for sixteen years. The base price was fifteen cents per
pound. That price had five components: Five cents was for a "demand
charge," that would roughly correspond to the capital costs of the capacity to produce that quantity; three cents for profit; one cent for administrative costs; three cents for labor costs; and three cents for nonlabor production costs. The labor costs were indexed to Alcoa's average hourly wages at its smelter; the non-labor production costs (mainly
electricity) were indexed to the Industrial Commodities component of
the Wholesale Price Index (WPI-IC). The remaining nine cents was
fixed for the duration of the agreement.
The problem, as framed by the parties and the court, was that, following the post-1973 jump in the price of oil, the WPI-IC did not accurately track Alcoa's non-labor production costs. But even if it had,
the contract would have failed. The price adjustment formula left nine
cents, 60% of the base price, unindexed in a period of high inflation.
21. Sometimes referred to as "meet or release" or "last look" or "first refusal" clauses.
22. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). For a
detailed analysis of the case, see GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 348-369.
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After 1973, the inflation rate was over 7% per year; even when the
contract was negotiated in 1968 it was over 4%. The result of this failure to index the nine-cent component of the formula would be that the
contract price would fall behind the market price of aluminum. Suppose
that at the end of ten years an index of prices for all goods would have
doubled. If real aluminum prices had remained constant, they too
would have doubled, and the market price would have risen to thirty
cents. However, while the indexed production costs would have risen
from six cents to twelve cents, the remaining nine cents would have
been unindexed, and the contract price would have been only 9+12=21
cents. While the market price of aluminum would have doubled, the
contract price would only have risen forty percent. The higher the inflation rate, the worse the price adjustment mechanism would perform.
The Alcoa-Essex contract illustrates how even very sophisticated
parties negotiating a multi-million dollar, long-term contract can fundamentally err when designing a price adjustment mechanism. Not
only did the parties fail to get it right ex ante, but they, their counsel,
the judge, and many commentators over the years also failed to get it
right ex post.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Parties face a number of problems when designing (or living with)
their contractual relationships. Information on the future is imperfect
and improvable at a cost; moreover, information on some aspects is
distributed asymmetrically. The incentives of the parties are imperfectly aligned. Circumstances change and the parties would like to
adapt to the new circumstances. The contract design problem is further
complicated by the fact that the interests of the parties are not completely compatible. The design has to take into account the possibility
that one of the parties will attempt to take advantage of the other party,
perhaps by misrepresenting facts in the pre-contract negotiations or opportunistically taking advantage of the other party's vulnerability to a
rewriting of the contract.
The design does not take place in an institutional vacuum. It will
reflect the possibility of future dealings between the parties or the availability of reputational constraints. And it will reflect the content of the
contract law and the quality and cost of its administration. If the costs
of litigating a complex commercial dispute are substantial and the likelihood that a lay jury would be able to make sense of the dispute is low,
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parties might attempt to design their relationship to avoid litigation regardless of the content of the contract law.

